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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: HOUSING PART B

--------------------------------------------------------------- ){
MARIA VARGAS,

'Index No. HP 1465/2019

Petitioner,
- against -

: DECISION/ORDER
112 SUFFOLK ST. APT. CORP., et al.,
Respondents.

--------------------------------------------------------------- ){
Present:

Hon. Jaclc Stoller
Judge, I-lousing Court

Recitation, as required by CPI..R §2219(a), of the papers consider~{d i11 t11e review oftl1is motion.

Numbered
Papers
Notice of Motion and Suppleme11tal Affirmation ·and Aftidavit Anpexed
1, 2, 3
Notice of Cross-Motion and Supplemental Affinnation and Affid~~:vits Annexed 4, 5, 6, 7
Affinnatio11 In further Support
8
Envelope and Certified Mail Documents
9,10,ll
12, 13
Affirmation and Affidavit of Respondents
Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision and Order on tlris _ti){otion are as follows:
'
Maria Vargas, the petitioner in thls proceeding

("Petitione~·"), commenced this Housing

Part proceeding ("I-IP proceedit1g") against 112 Suffoll( St. Apt. C'i?rp., the respondent in tl1is
proceeding ("Respo11de11t"), and the Departn1e11t of Housing Prese;~vation and Development of
the City of New York ("J-IPD"), seeking an ·order from the Court p~ursua11t to New York City
Civil Court Act §110 directing Respondent to correct the conditio-i1s that led to a vacate order
"'

being placed on 112 Suffollc Street, Apt. SC, New York, New Yoj!( ("the s11bject pre111ises").
Respondent interposed an answer ("tl1e Answer"). The Cotrrt calf;i~1dared this 111atter for trial to
Marcl1 4, 2020. Petitioner now inoves to dis1niss the defenses in t:l:te Answer and for sun1mary

1

'

judg1nent. Respondent cross-moves to hold Petitioner in contempt. The Court consolidates these
motions for resoJution herein.
The record on this n1otion practice shows tl1at no party diS}Jutes that Petitioner is 75 years
old; that Petitioner has resided in the subject premises since 1984;!_ that Petitioner is protected by
the Rent Stabilization Law with a two-year lease commencing Ju1_±e 1, 2018-with a monthly rent
of $750.98; that Respondent purchased the building in whicl1 tl1e ·Subject premises is located
("the Building") in 1986; that tl1e st1bject pren1ises is one of

fifte~J:1 apartments ih the Building;

that tl1ere was a fire at the subject premises on July 24, 2019; tl1at~HPD placed a partial vacate

'

1

order dated A11gust 20, 2019 on the subject premises ("tl1e VacatJ Order"); that tl1e Vacate Order
is specific to the subject premises; that the Vacate Order cites fir(;}:damage to the ceiling, walls,

'
and floor of the subject pren1ises, a lack of electricity at the subjed.t premises, and broken
windows of the subject pre1nises; tl1at HPD ordered Respo11dent tb con·ect the conditions
•,;

pursuant to N.Y.C Admin, Code §27-2125(a)(2); and that Respo~dent has not, as of the
submission of the n1o1ion, corrected the conditions.
The First Affirn1ative Defense oftl1c AI1swcr raises a pers~~11al j11risdictio11 defense. The
pleading consists of a bare denial of receipt of service, which is 1ri'sufficient to wan·ant a traverse
hearing under 11ormal circumstances. Benson Park Assoc. LLC v?Herman, 93 A.D.3d 609 (1 51
Dept. 2012), Slin1a11i v. Citibanl(. N.A., 47 A.D.3d 489 (1'1 Dept. f;008), Omansky v. Gurland, 4
A.D.3d 104, 108 (1 51 Dept. 2004). Be that as it may, the record co{1tai11s the envelop·e that

1

HPD has the power to order any d\velling which is unfit ·ror human 11abitation to be
vacated. N.YC Admin, Code §27-2139,
'
2

'

Petitioner used to inail Respo11dent the pleadings, and tl1e envelop;e, sent to Respo11dent by

certified mail, return receipt requested, had been returned to Petittbner marke'd "RETURN TO

"
SENDER I INSUFFICIENT ADDRESS I UNABLE TO FORWA:RD",
A tenant co111mencing an HP proceeding may serve tl1e pl~adi11gs as provided in the
Housing Maintenance Code ("the Code"), New York City Civil Court Act §11 O(m)(l ). The

Code provides for service by certified n1ail, return receipt request6d. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §2721150). MDL §325(1) requires owners of11111ltiple dwellings,

lik'.~ Respondent, to register an

address with I""IPD. Petitioner addressed the c11velope to Respond~~nt, care of"Nancy Sl1ul1'-' at
551 Pacific Street, Brooklyn, New Yorlc 11217,2 the very na1ne

a.J'.Id address that Respondent

previo11sly registered witl1 HPD pursuant to MDL §325(1). PetitiQner's reliarice on tl1e address
Respondent itself previously registered witl1 I-IPD was reasonabledand Respondent's use of that
address on tl1e prior registration estops Respo11de11t from contesti~ig the validity of service made
on that address. Compare Toure v. Harrison, 6 A.D.3d 270, 271 {\1st Dept. 2004).
Further1nore, the HPD records, wl1ich the Court can take _ri:idicial notice of pursuant to
MDL §328(3) and whicl1 are part of t11e record on this motion pra:~tice, show that Respondent has
i1ot kept its registration cutTent. Responde11t ca11not fail to compGr with the statutory requirement
to provide a valid address for notice Tegarding housing standards /ind then benefit from that
failure whe11, as a consequence, Respondent does not receive serV}ce of a pleading in an HP
proceeding. Compare Dep't ofHous. Pres. & Dev. of City ofN. Y\. v. Barrett, 20 Misc.3d

2

An exhibit annexed to Petitioner's 1notion papers is a phr,)tocopy of the certified mail
slip which cuts off the address so that it looks like "51 Pacific St1:tSet." The sub1nission of the
copy of the envelope clarifies that Petitioner mailed the pleading4'.to "551 Pacific Street."
3

135(A)(App. Term l" Dept. 2008), Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev.

dtv ofN.Y. v. 532-536 W.

143'' St. Realty Corp., 8 Misc.3d 136(A)(App. Term l" Dept. 2005), Dep't of Hoos. Pres. &
Dev. of City ofN.Y. v. 373 8'" St. Realty, 35 Misc.3d 147(A)(Appl Term 2"" Dept. 2012)(a
failure to comply with the registration requirements of MDL §325:;deprives a defaulting party in
an HP proceeding fro1n demonstrating the reasonable excuse i1eedl~d to vacate a default
•

judgment). See Also Matter ofMujahid v. N.Y.C. Dep't ofl-Ious.'Pres. & Dev., 2012 N.Y. Slip
Op. 30322(U),

~~

15-16 (S. Ct. N.Y. Co.)(an owner cannot merito(;iously claim that HPD should

have notified 11er of ce1tain violations when she listed so1neo11e ebfe as a managing agent).

Petitioner's service of the pleadings by certified mail, return

recei~t requested at Respondent's

most recent al1hougl1 outdated registered address was t11erefore suffi_cient and the Court grants

'"
Petitioner's motion to dismiss the First Affirmative Defe11se ofthe\:Answer.
The Second. Affir1native Defense of the Answer alleges thn;t Respondent did not receive
notices of violation. This defense misapprel1ends the nature of a t~11ant-initiated HP proceeding
as opposed to an HPD-initiated HP proceeding. The Code does re;Juire HPD to serve a notice of
violation upon an owner, N.Y.C. Admin. Code· §27-2115(b), and .:i:t'ailure to do so can constitute
a defense to an 1:-IPD-initiated HP proceediI1g. D' Agostino v. Fort\"-Three E. Equities Corp., 12
Misc.3d 486, 489-90 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2006), aff'd on other groz(nds, 16 Misc. 3d 59 (App.
Term 1st Dept. 2007). However, a tenant "may ... apply to tl1e [I-I]~1using [P]art for an order" if
1-IPD "fail[s] to issue a notice of violation .... " N.Y.C. Admin. Coste §27-2115(h)(l). 3 Ju a

3

While the statute requires that HPD 11ave thi1iy days to pl(1ce a violation before a tenru1t
initiates an HP proceeding, HPD has waived this requirement for ~i'.ll cases after February 11,
1977. Bing Chung Chan v. 60 Eldridge Corp., 129 Misc.2d 787, '(i88 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1985).

4

tenant-initiated HP proceeding, then, HPD's putative failure to seefve a notice of violation can
constitute a basis for a tenant's cause of actio11, not a defense to tl~~ tenant-initiated proceeding,
according to whicl1 HPD is a respondent as well.
Wl1ile Respondent claims in the Second Affirmative Defei·\se that tl1e Court lac1(s subject
matter j11risdiction, the Housing Co11rt in fact mait1tains jurisdicti(i'/n in an I.JP proceeding over
'
repairs necessary to have a vacate order rescinded. Rivellini v. Rtjlf, 43 Misc.3d 1202(A)(Civ.
Ct. N.Y. Co. 2014), Various Tenants of515 E. 12"' St. v. 515 E. 12'" St. Inc., 128 Misc.2d 235,
238 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1985), citing Matter of Miller v. Notre Da1\'le Hotel, N.Y.L.J., Dece1nber
17, 1980 at 11 :3 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co.). Accordingly, the Court gran~s Petitioner's motion to
disn1iss the Second Affirmative Defense of the Answer.
Tl1c Third, Sixtl1, and Seventh Affinnative Defenses

oftl1~Answer essentially blame

Petitioner for ca11sing the frre that precipitated t11e vacate order. TP,e Fifth Affirmative Defense
of tl1e Answer alleges that Responde11t cannot repair the subject pf:.emises because Petitioner has
failed to vacate possession t11ereof. The Tentl1 Affirmative Defen~e ofth·e Answer alleges tl1at
Petitio11er has denied Responde11t access. The few defenses to an.;{)rder to correct i11clude lack of
standing or jurisdiction, completed repairs, that conditions are noi . code violations, that a notice
of violation is facially insuf-ficient, that the respondent is no longe'!' the owner, and economic
infeasibility. D' Agostino, supra, 12 Misc.3d at 489-90, Castillo -·i! Banner Grp. LLC, 63 Misc.3d
1235(A)(Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2019). Wl1ile t11e Court 1nay consider_1letitioner's role in tl1e fire, an
allegation of denial of access, and/or an allegation of a failure to C9operate witl1 correction of
conditions upon a potential 1notion for conte1npt or civil

5

penalties,~:Respo11dent

does not state a

•\'

defense to an order to correct as a matter of Jaw. Accordingly, the:: Court grants Petitioner's
n1otion to dismiss t11e Third, Fiftl1, Sixth, Seventh, and Te11th Affl'i-mative Defenses oftl1e
Answer, without prejudice to any defenses Respondent may have-Jo any future motion for civil
penalties ru1d/or contempt, without prejudice to any cause of actiQi1 or motion Respondent may
seek to bring against Petitioner on those grounds, and without pre~udice to any defense and/or
opposition Petitioner n1ay 11ave to such a defense or cause of actioP.
:i
Tl1e Fourth and Ninth Affir1native Defenses of the Answe.t allege that Petitioner lacks
standing. Ordinarily, a laWful occupant of a premises has standin:g to commence an HP
proceeding. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §27-21 lS(h)(l). Respondent q!Jes no,t dispute tl1at Petitioner
is a rent-stabilized tenant of the subject premises with a lease in e·rJect as of t11is writit1g, a status
1noreover entitling her to lease renewals. N. Y .C. Admi11. Code §i6-511 (c}(4), 9 N. Y .C.R.R.
§2523.S(a). As a matter of law, tl1e Vacate Order, iI1 and of itself; did not ter1ninate Petitio11er's
tenancy. Eyedent v. Vickers Manage1nent, 150 A.D.2d 202, 204 (1 '1 Dept. 1989), citing Matter
of Department ofB!dgs. (Philco Realty Corp.), 14 N.Y.2d 291, 3(\2 n.2 (1964), Garber v. Egger,
)

132 N.Y.S.2d 371 (App. Term 1" Dept. 1954).
Respondent argues that the fire destroyed tl1e subject pre1'ri4ses sucl1 that there is 110 longer
any s11bject premises for Petitioner to be a tenant of, thus effectiv~-ly terminating Petitione5_'s
"

-

tenancy. Respondent's CEO and the president of a contractor that Respondent retained both aver
in opposition to Petitioner's motion that smoke damage, water ctapage, and mold in the subject
premises require the removal ru1d replacen1e11t of all ceilings, wall~, floors, and what they call
"attachments" therein. For tl1e purposes of this motion,

6

th~ Court)assumes the truth of these

factual allegatio11s. In re Liquidation of Ideal Mttt. Ins. Co., 140 Ai.D.2d 62, 67 (1 it Dept. 1988),
Vigna v. Galeano, 18 Misc.3d 112l(A)(Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2008).
Respondent relies upon the proposition that \.Vhen a fire da.{)1ages a ''building" to the
extent that an owner has "no real cl1oice but to de1nolish it/' a priQ'_r tenancy in such a building
ceases to exist. Quiles v. Term Eqt1ities, 22 A.D.3d 417, 421 (1 51 f)ept. 2005). Sin1ilarly, when a
fire reduces a "buildi11g'' to an "empty shell," with no windows, ct\llapsed floor joists and
:i

stairwells, and an absence of a boiler, copper piping, ·or other funqtioning systems, sttch a fire
effectuates an "effective demoli[tion]" of that building that operat~~s to terminate the tenancies

:;

that had been tl1ere. Gregoretii v. 92 Morningside Ave. LLC, 166<A.D.3d 466, 466 (1 si Dept.
2018). However, assuming arguendo t11e truth of Respondent's f;;i.¢tual assertions, Respondent
does not address the fact that t11e subject pre1nises is only one of fi~·~een apartments in the
Building. Respondent does not allege that tl1e Building is an "en1~ftY shell" without :functioning
syste1ns. The Vacate Order does not apply to other apartments in '.ihe Building, con1pelling the
conclttsion that other apartments in the Building are fit for

occup~;,1cy.

If whatever existed in the same place as tl1e subject premi11''.~s after repairs was a "new"
apartment, Respondent would l1ave a colorable argt1ment. I-Iowe\.i1;r, Petitioner is protected by
the Rent Stabilization Law. To show the birtl1 ofa '"new" unregul{1ted apartment in t11e srune
location as a prior rent-stabilized aprut1nent, an owner must show::!1 substantial move and change
of the perimeter walls to the extent that the.previous apartn1ent ess;entially ceases to exist, sucl1 as
when an owner converts a single two-bedroom aprutment i11to twcr studio apa1tme11ts, or,
conversely, two smaller units into a si11gle larger unit. Devlin v. New York State Div. of I-Ious.

7

& Cmty. Renewal, 309 A.D.2d 191, 194 (!"'Dept. 2003), leave topppeal denied, 2 N.Y.3d 705

(2004), 325 Melrose. LLC v. Bloemendall, 65 Misc.3d 43, 46 (ApJ\. Term. 2"d Dept. 2019).
Similarly, an exte11sion of an apartment into new construction on ci~rooftop reconfigures an
apartment to 1l1e extent of rendering it "new." Dixon v. 105 W. 75:111 St. LLC, 148 A.D.3d 623,
626 (I st Dept. 2017). Notably, Respondent does i1ot allege that th~': di1nensions of whatever
would exist it1 the same place as the subject premises after repairs,Would be any different from
tl1e subject premises 11or that its use would be for a purpose other ihan a residential apartment.
As noted above, Petitioner moves in the alternative for summary judgrne11t. In opposition

•
:i

to the motion, Respondent must lay bare and reveal its proofs in o!,der to show real issues of fact
that it is capable of establishing at trial. Rodriguez v. City ofN.Y·:·~ 142 A.D.3d 778, 788 (1 si
•
Dept. 2016). Mere conclusions, expressions of hope, or unsubstad.tiated allegations or assertions
are insufficient to defeat sum1nary judgme11t . .Justinian Capital S~'.= v. WestLB AG N.Y.
Bra11ch, 28 N.Y.3d 160, 168 (2016). If all that Respondent can of~'er is that the subject premises
requires areplace1nent of wans, floors, ceili11g, and attachments, if:espondent does not show that
the Buildi11g would ltndergo a "demolition" of the scale necessary,·~o effectively terminate
Petitioner's tenancy, nor does Respondent show that a "new" apafi.ment will replace the subject
premises. Summary judgment does not de11y tl1e pa11ies a trial, it 1:~1erely ascertains that there is
nothing to try. Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs. ex rel. Michi;iel V. v. James M., 83 N.Y.2d
178, 182 (1994). Assuming the truth ofResponde11t's factual subipissions, Respondent simply
does not demonstrate an extent of repairs necessary to outweigh tl~.'~ endurance of a

rent~stabilized tenancy during a vacate order.

Farrell v. E.G.A.

As~ocs .. Inc., 9Misc.3d1l18(A)
'

8

(Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2005), citing Carrasquillo v. 197 Columbia Rei'\lty
Corp., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 2,
.
1992, at 25:2 (Civ. Ct. Kings Co.).
Respondent also argues tl1at Petitioner's te11ancy terminate}! by operation oftl1e
objectionable co11duct Respondent alleges. However, Respondentjn1ay only terminate
Petitioner's rent-stabilized tenancy on sucl1 a ground upon service:'ofan appropriate notice. See 9
N.Y.C.R.R. §2524 et seq. Respondent, of course, would then hav,e; to commence a holdover

:;

proceeding against Petitio11er and then obtain a final judgn1ent ag~ti11st her ratifyit1g its
termination of her te11ancy in order to obtain possession oft11e sttl{ject pren1ises from her. Be that
as it may, even tl1e issuance of a warrant of eviction against a ten~1?t pursuant to such a
possessory judgment does not deprive tl1e tenant of standing to coJ:nmence and prosecute an I-IP
proceeding against tl1at tenant's landlord. Cruz v. Square Block A'ssoc., Inc., 29 Misc.3d
1207(A)(Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2010), citing Shapiro v. Townan Reaa:t Co., 162 Misc.2d 630,. 632
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1994). Respondent does not show any proof o·f any sucl1 cloud on Petitioner's
lease and rent-stabilized status. Accordingly, the Cou1t grants- Peijtioner's motion to dismiss the
)

Fourth and Ninth Affirmative Defenses of the Answer.
Tl1e Eighth Affinnative Defense oftl1e Answer pleads the:-;)efense of economic
infeasibility. Respondent, in opposition to Petitio11er's motion to J;lismiss this defense, presents
evide11ce that it obtai11ed an esti1nate of $520,230.97 to correct the'. conditio11s and tl1at
Respondent will 011ly receive $382,000.00 from insurance to corrC,'ct the conditions. Respondent
also posits that, at a legally-stabilized rent of$750.98, Respondent· could not expect the recoup
the cost of restoring the subject pren1ises to l1abitability on any

9

re~~sonable time horizon.

For the

purposes of this motio11, the Court assumes t11e truth of Rcspondex:_tt's factual allegations. Vigna,
supra, 18 Misc.3d at 112 l(A).
The I-lousing Mai11tenance Code does not provide a defenS':e of economic infeasibility.
'fhe defe11se has arisen fron1 case law as an exercise of equitable d_iscretio11. 153-155 Essex St.
Tenants Ass'n v. Kahan, 4 Misc.3d 1008(A)(Civ. Ct. N. Y. Co. 2904). An owner states such a
defense if it can prove that the cost to repair a building exceeds it<>: value after the repairs. Id.,
Hous. & Dev. Adrnin. v. Johan Realty Co., 93 Misc.2d 698, 703 (App. Term I" Dept. 1978),
Farrell v. E.G.A. Assocs. Inc., 9 Misc.3d 1118(A)(Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2005). 4
··.

Respondent focuses on the subject pre1nises itself rather tI{,s.n the Building. However, the
relevant authority addresses an econo1nic infeasibility defense wit!) reference to tl1e value of a
"building," not an individual apartment in a building. For exampi~, a lm1dlord fails to support an
economic infeasibility defense when the record does not contain p~oof of the curre11t value of a
"premises," the premises being defined as an entire bt1ildi11g.

Eye~lent,

supra, 150 A.D.2d at

205. 5 Similarly, in evalt1ating an economic infeasibility defense, t11e Court-looks to factors such
as the actual or assessed value of the premises, current offers for tf1e properly, the tax assessment
of the buildiI1g, and the financial operating statement of the premi;,:es, including the rent roll,

4

Respondent, as well as various at1thorities cited here, cite-: Be1nard v. Scharf, 246 A.D.2d
171 (1st Dept. 1998) in support of this propositio11. I-Iowever, tl1e ·i~ourt of Appeals reversed and
remitted the matter for dismissal on the grounds of i11ootness, BerJ.tard v. Scharf, 93 N.Y.2d 842
(1999), which has the effect of depriving the decision of precedell(:ial value. Hearst Corp. v.
Clyne, 50N.Y.2d 707, 718 (1980).
.
5

t\.VO

This decision identified ('premises" as "residential pren1i:;es (premises) ... consist[ing] of
adjacent bt1ildi11gs[] contain[i11g] 20 apart1nents." Evedent, S~!2ffi, 150 A.D.2d at 202.

IO

Farrell, supra, 9 Misc.3d at l l l 8(A), Gonzalez v. Navarro, N.Y.LJ., August 10, 1994, at 25:2
(Civ. Ct. Kings Co.), measures whicl1 do not apply to an individu8) rental u11it as opposed to a
building as a whole.

Jurisprude11ce co11cer11ing the "Takings" Clause oftl1e Fift_h
Amendn1ent6 informs the
··.
Cou1i's detern1ination as to an appropriate baseline to apply to m1··~conomic infeasibility defense,
especially given the role tl1e 1"akings Clause plays in the developrn_ent of the defense, Bernard,
)
7

supra, 246 A.D.2d at 176, and Respondent's own citation of tl1e ·;fa.kings Clause. The test to
determine whether a gover11rnental action effectuates a taking e11tc.dls a comparison betwee11 the
val11e that has been taken from the property with the value that reniains in the property. Murr v.
Wisconsi11, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943-44 (2017). ·r11c '·property" in st..~ch an analysis means the
•
property "as a whole," Matter of Stahl York Ave. Co., LLC v.

Ci~ ofN.Y., 162 A.D.3d 103, 113

(l ''Dept. 2018), citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2662 (1978),
Darbonne v. Goldberger, 31 A.D.3d 693, 695 (2nd Dept. 2006), Ja~'llaicaRecycling Com. v. City
of New York 2006 N.Y.L.J. LEXlS 432, *32 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co.)(Richter, J.), rather than on
"discrete segments of tl1e property.'·' Matter of City ofN. Y. (Sot1th Richmond Bl11ebclt. Phase
3-594 Assoc. Inc.), 60 Misc.3d 232, 237 (S. Ct. Richmond Co.1.018). After all, a regulatory
burde11on011e part of the property does not leave the property eco;\omically idle if the ovmer
retaiI1s an ability to engage in development or business on some other part of the property.

6

"[N]or sh·aJI private property be taken for public use, witl1outjust compensation .... "
U.S. Constitutio11, An1endment V.
7

But See footnote 4.
11

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2465 (2001). See, Llk, Matter of Stahl York Ave.
Co., LLC, supra, 162 A.D.3d at 115 (a prohibition of demolition ciflandmarked property docs not
effectuate a taking given that the owner may still rent u11its in the e)xtant property). The
appropriate measure of"property" for this pt1rpose can even encor(1pass two adjoining parcels of
property. Murr, supra, 137 S. Ct. at 1938. 8
Respondent purchased tl1is fifteen-unit rent-stabilized n1ultjple dwelling in 1986, after

Petitioner's rent-stabilized tenancy had conunenced, not 011e t1nit of the Building at a time. A
multiple dwelling like the Building generates building-wide re11ta(i11come and incurs
building-wide operations and maintenance costs. Tl1e appropriat~:.n1easure of m1 economic
iI1feasibility defense is not the incon1e-generating potential of one,:•)part1nent as against tl1at one
apartment's operational ot maintenm1ce cost, but tl1e value of the d.ntire property against tl1e cost
of repairs.
As noted above, on tl1is sumrnary judgment nlotion, Respof1dent must Jay bare a11d reveal
its proots in order to show real issues of fact that it is capable of e~tablishing at trial. Rodriguez,
supra, 142 A.D.3d at 78.8. Respondent only interposed fact issues:;·as to the subject pr~rnises
itself, rather than the Building. As Respondent made no allegations comparing the cost of lifting
the Vacate Order against the value of the Building, Respondent difl not make a showing

8

Even t11e dissent in Mttrr, supra, does not support Resporj!1ent's position t11at or:ie
apartment in a fifteen-unit building is the appropriate measure against wl1ich a governmental
action burdens a property owner, fi11ding t11at boundm·ies of disti11dt units of land sl1ould
"detern1ine tl1e parcel at isstte." MtllT, supra, 137 S. Ct. at 1953 (I~.oberts, J., dissenting). The
"parcel" at issue herein is the block and lot tl1e Building is located.ion, not t11e subject pren1ises
itself.
·'

12

sufficient to defeat Petitioner's su1nmary judgment n1otion. Belle-_:Lighting LLC v. Artisan
Constr. Partners LLC, 2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 09359, ~ 1 (App. Div. 1" Dept.).
Lastly, Respondent's averme11t about an i11sufficient insur~i-rice recovery is irrelevant as a
matter of law. Bing Chung Chan, supra, 129 Misc.2d at 791. "Re?pondent's unilateral decision
011 the amount of insurance it chose to carry cannot determine the,fequired scope of repairs. Any
other conclusion encourages underinsurance." Id. Accordingly, tlje Cottrt grants Petitioner's
motion to dismiss the Eigl1th Affirmative Defc11se oftl1e A11swer. ·Tl1e Eleventh Affirmative Defense of the Answer denies tb_at Respondent harassed
Petitioner. The four corners of the petition do not contain the woi'd "l1arassment," which is a
distinct ca11se of action tenants have against landlords pursuant to >·J. Y.C. Admin. Code
§27-2005(d). Otherwise refraining fTorn harassing a tenant is not:f_; cognizable defense to an HP
proceeding. D' Agostino, supra, 12 Misc.3d at 489-90, Castillo, s-0:!2@-, 63 Misc.3d at 1235(A).
Accordingly, the Court gra11ts the 111otion to dismiss the Eleventh-i\ffirmative
Defe11se of the
'
Answer, witl1out prejudice to Respondent's defenses to any

haras~<nent

petition Petitioner may

ever file agai11st Responde11t.
As tl1e C·ourt has dismissed all of Respondent's defenses ir.1 the Artswer, as Petitioner has
moved for su1n1nary judgment, as no party clisputes the existence ~fthe Vacate Order, as
Petitio11er is a tenant of the subject premises, as Respondent ls the-:owner oftl1e subject premises,
and as the Court has the jurisdiction pt1rst1ant to New York City C1vil Court Act § 110 to entertain
Petitioner's cause of action, Rivellini, supra, 43 Misc.3d at 1202(.A), Various Tenants of 515 E.
121h St., supra, 128 Misc.2d at 238, the Cowt enters into an order
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16' correct, to wit, by directing

Respondent to con·ect conditions necessary so as to lift. the Vacate,· order on or before March 31,
2020. On default of this order, any party inay move for ahy appro1'.>riate relief. As stated above,
this order is withot1t prejudice to any defenses of Respondent to s1~:ch a motion, without prejudice
any cause of action Respondent has against Petitioner, without prejudice to any motion of
Respondent to extend tl1e ti1ne to comply with t11is order, which niay be granted upon good cause
shown, and without prejudice to any opposition or defense to any-.such motio11 of Respondent.
The C.ourt strikes this matter from the trial calendar on March 4, 2!)20 and no party need appear
on that day.
As Petitioner has obtained an order to correct by this order1. tl1e ultimate relief in a11 l·IP
proceeding, N.Y.C. Adn1i11. Code §27-2115(h)(l ), Petitioner is the: prevailing party in this
litigation. The Court therefore grai1ts Petitioner's motion to dismJ;·,s the First Counterclaim oftl1c
Answer seeking a judgment ll1 Respondent)s legal fees. 542 E.

14'.h St. LLC v. Lee, 66 A.D.3d

18, 24-25 (1" Dept. 2009), Sykes v. RFD Third Ave. I Assoc., LLC;, 39 A.D.3d 279 (l" Dept.
2007), Board of Managers of55 Walker Street Condomini1nn v. \~.falkcr Street LLC, 6 A.D.3d
279, 280 (I" Dept. 2004).
Respondent cross-moves for conten1pt against Petitioner. :;\s a tl1reshold matter,
Petitioner opposes the 1notio11 011 the ground that Respondent serv.i:d Petitioner with the motion
on less t11an ten days' notice. Judiciary Law §756 requires service'_ of sucl1 a motion on at least
ten days' notice bttt no more than thirty days' notice except if othc;rwise ordered by the.Court or
in accordance with CPLR §5250. While the Court draws the

infei~nce

that Respondent served

its motion on the time frame it did because Respondent moved for; conte111pt by notice of

14

cross-motion, wl1ere a law expressly describes a particular thing ti.:i which it shall apply, the Court
must .draw an "irrefutable inference" that the Legislature intended:;to omit or exclude wl1at the
Legislatme omitted or excluded. Myers v. Sclmeiderman, 30 N.I(3d I, I2 (2017), Matter of
Shannon, 25 N.Y.3d 345, 352 (2015), Matier of Raynor v. Landm,\rk Chrysler, 18 N.Y.3d 48, 56
:~

(2011), Town of Riverhead v. N.Y. State Bd. of Real Prop. ServsO, 5 N.Y.3d 36, 42-43 (2005).
As the drafters of the Judiciary Law §756 created an exception to tl1e time for service with
reference to CPLR §5250 and not CPLR §2215, the provision to "\Vhich cross-motions apply, the
Court must construe the omission to be i11tentional. The Court tht,:xefore denies Responde11t's
motion for co11tempt. As a detenni11ation 011 defective service do9.s not reach the merits of the
motion, See Wynn v. Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 12 A.D.3d 1100 (41h DePt. 2004), Sumar v. Fox, 2_010
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2307 (S. Ct. N. Y. Co. 2010), ajj"d, 90 A.D.3d"(i77 (l" Dept. 2011 ), the Court
denies the motion withot1t prejudice, Ko1nolov v. Segal, 96 A.D.3-_c:l 513 (1 si Dept. 2012), if t11e
facts wmTant anotl1er sucl1 motion. The Cou1t re-affirms its order-:Jr
.. November 14,. 2019,
directing Petitioner not to occupy in the st1bject pren1ises while the:· Vacate Order is in place.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, that the-Court dismisses all oftl1e defenses and the counterclaim contained in
Respondent's Answer, and it is furtl1er
ORDERED, that the Court directs Respondent to Correct the cond,i_tions that caused I-IPD to place
the Vacate Order 011 the subject premises on or before Marcl131, 2:020, subject to the conditions
set forth in the decision, and it is fu1ther
ORDERED, that tl1e Court strikes this matter from the trial

calendh.r~ and it is further

15

_____________

,,,,

ORDERED that the Court denies Rcsponde11t's motion to 11old Py,dtioner in co11tempt, subject to
the co11ditions set forth in the' decision.
This constitutes tl1e decision and order of this Court.
Dated: New York, New York
January 28, 2020

(/re::
_____
.·._________
HON.) ACK STOLLER

J.H.C.
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